This paper estimates international spillover e¤ects of US Quantitative Easing (QE) on emerging market economies. Using a Bayesian VAR on monthly US macroeconomic and …nancial data, we …rst identify the US QE shock with non-recursive identifying restrictions. This identi…ed shock is then used in another Bayesian VAR for emerging market economies to infer the international spillover e¤ects on these countries. We …nd that an expansionary US QE shock has signi…cant, if temporary, e¤ects on …nancial variables in emerging market economies. It leads to an exchange rate appreciation, a reduction in long-term bond yields, and a stock market boom in both the "Fragile Five" and other emerging market economies. Apart from positive e¤ects on equity ‡ows and a reduction in net exports for some of the "Fragile Five" countries, we do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects of the US QE shock on other macroeconomic variables of emerging market countries such as output and consumer prices.
Introduction
As a countercyclical response to the …nancial crisis and the onset of the Great Recession in 2007, the Federal Reserve drastically cut the short-term interest rate, the conventional monetary policy instrument. Once the short-term interest rate hit the zero lower bound at the end of 2008 however, the Federal Reserve engaged in unconventional monetary policy, buying long-term government bonds and private sector assets. This policy, referred to as quantitative easing, greatly a¤ected the size and composition of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve and was meant to provide further monetary stimulus to the economy by lowering long-term interest rates, even though the short-term nominal interest rate was stuck at the zero lower bound. 1 In this paper, we evaluate the international spillover e¤ects of the quantitative easing program of the Federal Reserve by assessing its impact on emerging market economies.
There has been an active and in ‡uential empirical literature, e.g. Gagnon et al (2011) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Neely (2010) , trying to assess rigorously the e¤ects of such large-scale asset purchase program on interest rates, expected in ‡ation, and other asset prices such as exchange rates. 2 The dominant approach in this literature is to assess the "announcement e¤ects" of such policies, i.e. the response of high-frequency …nancial market variables to the Federal Reserve's announcements of policy changes within a very narrow time frame, such as one or two days. By focussing on a narrow time window and isolating the changes in these variables due to the announcement of quantitative easing policy, this literature has shown that such policies most likely contributed to lowering long-term US interest rates and depreciating the US Dollar.
We contribute to this literature by taking an alternate complementary approach. We identify the e¤ects of quantitative easing using an identi…ed vector auto regression (VAR), in a manner similar to that widely used for assessing the e¤ects of conventional monetary policy. 3 This allows us to extend the insights from the announcement e¤ects literature by 1 The decision to purchase large volumes of assets by the Federal Reserve came in three steps, known as QE1, QE2 and QE3 respectively. On November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced purchases of housing agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) of up to $600 billion. On March 2009, the FOMC decided to substantially expand its purchases of agency-related securities and to purchase longer-term Treasury securities as well, with total asset purchases of up to $1.75 trillion, an amount twice the magnitude of total Federal Reserve assets prior to 2008. On September 2011, the Federal Reserve announced a new program on Operation Twist that involved purchasing $400 billion of long-term treasury bonds by selling short-term treasury bonds. This program was further extended in June 2012 till the end of the year. On September 2012, the last round of quantitative easing was announced, which consisted of an open ended commitment to purchase $40 billion mortgage backed securities per month. On Decemeber 2012, this program was expanded further by adding the purchase of $45 billion of long-term treasury bonds per month. Quantitative easing o¢ cially ended on October 2014. 2 An incomplete list of other papers in this literature is Hamilton and Wu (2012) , Wright (2011) , and Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) . 3 In taking a VAR based approach to assess the e¤ects of QE, our paper is related to Baumeister and Benati (2013) , Gambacorta et al (2014) , and Wright (2012) . Our identi…cation approach is however, di¤erent. both assessing the impact on broader macroeconomic variables that policymakers focus on, such as output and consumer prices, as well as ascertaining the dynamic e¤ects of such policy. Moreover, while there is work assessing the international e¤ects of U.S. quantitative easing policy, e.g. Leduc (2012, 2013) , Chen et al (2011) , and Bauer and Neely (2013) , we focus on the e¤ects on emerging market economies. In doing so, we are particularly motivated by the reports in media and policy circles regarding the spillover e¤ects on …nancial markets of emerging markets, both during the ongoing phase of the quantitative easing program as well as its tapering and eventual end. 4 In this respect, while using very di¤erent empirical methods, we are contributing in the same vein as Eichengreen and Gupta (2013) and Aizenman et al (2014) . Finally, given our results on equity ‡ows, our work is related to Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) and Lim et al (2014) , who also analyzed the e¤ects of US unconventional monetary policy on capital ‡ows to developing/emerging market economies using a di¤erent approach to identi…cation and inference.
In implementing our approach, we use several measures of the asset side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet as a measure of the unconventional policy instrument since 2008, with security held outright as our baseline measure. 5 Moreover, in this context, we propose and use new identi…cation strategies that allow us to separate the exogenous changes in quantitative easing policy from the endogenous changes of policy in response to the state of the economy. The approach is broadly motivated by the existing VAR literature that identi…es a conventional monetary policy shock, in particular the identi…cation approach of Sims and Zha (2006 a,b).
We …rst estimate an identi…ed Bayesian VAR using monthly US data on both macroeconomic and …nancial variables. In our baseline estimation, we identify a strong impact of a positive shock to the asset holdings of the Federal Reserve on both US output and prices as well as robust evidence of reduction in US long-term Treasury yields and an increase in stock prices. In an extension, we also provide evidence of reduction in US corporate and mortgage yields as well as a depreciation of the US Dollar and an increase in US house prices. Thus, our results for the impact of QE on …nancial variables are consistent with the …nding of the announcement e¤ect literature, and moreover, our VAR speci…cation allows us to document a strong macroeconomic impact.
Given the identi…ed QE shock from the estimated baseline US VAR, we estimate a separate Bayesian VAR involving macro and …nancial variables for each of the emerging markets, in which the US QE shock is treated as an exogenous variable. We estimate international spillover e¤ects of the US QE shock on the following important emerging market economies: Chile, Colombia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 6 First, we focus on results on the so called "Fragile Five" countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa, and then analyze whether our results di¤er for the rest of the emerging economies. Our results show a strong and largely robust e¤ect of the US QE shock on …nancial variables, in particular, on exchange rates and long term interest rates. We …nd that a positive US QE shock appreciates these foreign currencies and drives down foreign long-term government yields. We also …nd suggestive evidence that a positive US QE shock drives up stock prices in these emerging market economies. These e¤ects are common across all of the emerging market countries, although the "Fragile Five" countries show more signi…cant responses.
Moreover, equity ‡ows to these emerging markets increase following a positive US QE shock, although the e¤ects are imprecisely estimated and more signi…cant for the "Fragile Five"countries. We also …nd some evidence of a negative e¤ect on trade ‡ows on some of the "Fragile Five"countries, but little evidence suggesting a signi…cant impact of the US QE shock on industrial production and consumer prices for any of the emerging economies. Thus overall, there is stronger evidence of spillover e¤ects of US QE policy on …nancial variables compared to real macroeconomic variables and a stronger impact on the "Fragile Five"countries.compared to other emerging market economies in our sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while section 3 describes the methodology for identifying the US QE shock and for estimating the spillover e¤ects on the emerging market economies. In section 4, we describe the results, …rst for the US economy, and then for the emerging market economies. We conclude in section 5 by discussing our main results and topics for future research.
Data
We use US macroeconomic and …nancial data at the monthly frequency from June 2008 to June 2014 obtained from the FRED database and Core Logic. 7 We employ the series of securities held outright by the Federal Reserve as a measure of unconventional monetary policy. It consists of the holdings of US Treasury securities, Federal agency debt securities, and 6 We choose these countries following classi…cation of emerging economies by the IMF and Morgan Stanley. We exclude countries that su¤ered from major economic crises during our sample period or are in the Eurozone (and hence are more vulnerable to the European debt crisis) as well as some other countries which have followed some non-traditional exchange rate policy such as China and Russia. 7 All the data is from FRED except for the House Price Index data from Core Logic. mortgage-backed securities by the Federal Reserve and thus is an important measure of the size of the asset side of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. In particular, these holdings are due to outright purchases by the Federal Reserve, which were a main component of unconventional monetary policy actions. 8 Figure 1 plots securities held outright along with 10-year Treasury yields, S&P 500 index, and nominal (trade-weighted) e¤ective exchange rate. The vertical lines represent the major dates of onset of Lehman crisis, several phases of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, and the taper talk. This …gure suggests that after some lag, these interventions likely contributed to driving down long-term interest rates, led to a stock market boom and depreciation of the US dollars. We assess international spillover e¤ects of the quantitative easing on the following important emerging market countries: Chile, Colombia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. We collect output, prices, USD exchange rate, stock market index, long term and short term interest rates data from Datastream and Bloomberg, trade ‡ows data from Direction of Trade Statistics and capital ‡ows datafrom EPFR. We …rst focus on a subset of these countries, Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey, as they reacted very strongly to the possibility of withdrawal of the QE program as mentioned by the Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke, in May 2013. In popular media, these countries thus came to be known as the "Fragile Five"due to the potential vulnerability of their economies to US QE policy. We then next analyze whether these countries reacted any di¤erently from the rest of the emerging market economies to the US QE shock. Figure 4 ) and capital in ‡ows ( Figure  5 ). In addition, on May 2013, the "taper scare" period, during which …nancial markets were surprised by the Federal Reserve's intentions of slowing down its purchases of long-term assets and which turn lead to expectation of tighter policy and higher long-term interest rates in the U.S. (Figure 1 ), this subset of emerging market countries experienced higher interest rates and lower stock prices (Figures 2 and 3 ), depreciated exchange rates ( Figure 4 ), and capital out ‡ows ( Figure 5 ). More generally, Figures 2-5 illustrate some of the international spillovers of quantitative easing policies adopted by the U.S. Federal Reserve.
Methodology
We …rst estimate a monthly VAR on the US data using Bayesian methods to identify US QE shocks. The baseline VAR for the US economy includes the index for industrial production as a measure of output, the private consumption expenditures (PCE) de ‡ator as a measure of the price level, securities held outright on the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve as a measure of the monetary policy instrument, 10-year Treasury yields as a measure of long-term interest rates, and the S&P500 index as a measure of asset prices. The size of the Federal Reserve balance sheet as measured by the securities held outright is assumed to be the instrument of the QE program after the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates started binding in the US. We include the stock market price index, unlike much of the literature, in the US VAR as the outcomes and e¤ects on the …nancial market were an important aspect of policy making during the QE period. We impose non-recursive short-run restrictions on the US VAR to identify exogenous variations in the securities held outright, which are referred to as QE shocks, in an approach similar to that employed by, for example, Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006a; 2006b ) to identify US conventional monetary policy shocks. 9 Speci…cally, consider a VAR model
where y t is an n 1 vector of endogenous variables and " t N (0; I n ) with E (" t jy t 1 ; y t 2 ; ) = 0. Table 1 describes identifying restrictions on A 0 where the columns correspond to the variables while the rows correspond to the sectors. The …rst two sectors ("Prod1" and "Prod2") in Table 1 are sectors related to the real 
Notes: "X" indicates that the corresponding coe¢ cient of A 0 is not restricted and blanks mean that the corresponding coe¢ cient of A 0 is restricted to zero. economy, determining relatively slow-moving variables like output and prices. The third equation ("I") refers to the information sector and determines the fast-moving asset price variables which react contemporaneously to all the variables. In these three sectors, our identi…cation assumptions follow Sims and Zha (2006b) directly. The last two equations ("F" and "MS") in Table 1 are respectively the long-run interest rate determination and policy equation. For the policy equation, we assume that the monetary policy instrument reacts contemporaneously only to the long-term interest rate. The assumption that the Federal Reserve does not react contemporaneously to industrial production and prices is the same as in Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006a; 2006b) . Here, we additionally posit no contemporaneous reaction of the policy instrument to the stock price index on the grounds that the Federal Reserve would not want to respond immediately to temporary ‡uctuations in stock prices. We thus postulate that the QE policy of the Federal Reserve is well approximated by a rule that determines the Federal Reserve's purchase for securities as a linear function of the contemporaneous long-term yield and the lags of macroeconomic and …nancial variables. The long-run interest rate determination equation embodies restrictions similar to those in the traditional money demand equation in Sims and Zha (2006b) where the long-term interest rate adjusts contemporaneously to changes in output, prices, and asset purchases by the Federal Reserve.
In order to identify these two last equations separately, we follow Sims and Zha (2006b) and impose the following restrictions on the prior distribution of the coe¢ cients known as the "Liquidity Prior." In the interest rate determination equation ("F"), long-term yields tend to decrease as securities held outright increase (speci…cally, Corr (a 1 ; a 2 ) = 0:8), while in the policy equation ("MS"), securities held outright tend to increase as long-term yields increase (speci…cally, Corr (a 3 ; a 4 ) = 0:8). The latter implies a natural restriction that policy makers would purchase more securities in response to a rise in long-term interest rates. Note that here the restrictions are on the correlation coe¢ cients in the prior distribution, and hence, are weaker than the sign restrictions imposed on the impulse responses (e.g. those imposed by Gambacorta et al (2014)) .
After identifying the QE shock from the estimated US VAR, we assess its dynamic e¤ects on the emerging economies by feeding it into a system of equations for the emerging market economies. Speci…cally, for emerging market economy i, we estimate a baseline four-variable Bayesian VAR with the US QE shock as an exogenous variable:
where z i;t is an m 1 vector of endogenous variables, " QE;t is the US QE shock estimated in the US VAR and u i;t N (0; u i ) with E (u i;t jz i;t 1 ; z i;t 2 ; ) = 0, and analyze the impulse response to an increase in the US QE shock. In our baseline speci…cation, we include industrial production, CPI, 3-month interest rates and bilateral exchange rates against the US Dollar.
Because of limitations on the number of data points, we …rst estimate this four-variable VAR and then add one additional variable at a time to assess the impact of the US QE shock on other important variables such as stock prices, long-term yields, equity ‡ows, and trade ‡ows. Note that here it is important to include the short-term interest rate in this VAR to control for endogenous response of monetary policy in these countries to the US QE shock. This two-step estimation of the e¤ect of the US QE shock on an emerging market economy is equivalent to estimating its e¤ect in a VAR for both the US and the emerging market economy with a block exclusion restriction that the emerging market economy does not in ‡uence the US economy at all except for di¤erences due to simulation of the posterior distribution. For ease of estimation, we prefer to identify and estimate the US QE shock in a VAR for the US economy only and then use the estimated QE shock in a separate VAR for emerging market economies. 10 The details of estimation are as follows. We include six lags of the variables in the US VAR, in a baseline speci…cation and in a speci…cation for robustness exercises, and use the data in the period from 2008:1 through 2008:6 as initial conditions. The US VAR is estimated using Bayesian methods with the Minnesota prior-type priors as in Sims and Zha (2006b) and we extract the QE shock as the posterior median of the identi…ed QE shock. 11 VAR models for emerging market economies include three lags for endogenous variables and three lags of the US QE shock. Note that the estimated US QE shock is available only from 2008:7. The sample period for the VARs for emerging market economies starts from 2008:8, but the …rst three observations (2008:8-2008:11) are used as lags in the VAR for emerging market economies. Because of the concern on the degrees of freedom of the VARs for emerging market economies with the estimated US QE shock included, we include only three lags of endogenous variables. A Minnesota type prior similar to that for the US VAR is also employed for the emerging market VARs. 12 
Results
We now present our results on the identi…cation and e¤ects of the US QE shock based on the methodology described above. We start …rst with our estimates of the domestic e¤ects of the US QE shock as well as our inference of the shock series. We then study the spillover e¤ects of the US QE shock on emerging market economies. We …nally present some robustness checks.
Domestic E¤ects of US QE Shock
From our estimated US VAR, we analyze the impulse responses to a positive shock in securities held outright, identi…ed as an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock. Figure 6 shows the impulse responses for the baseline system. We …nd robust evidence in favor of a positive response in industrial production after a lag of 5 months and an immediate positive e¤ect on consumer prices. Moreover, the …nancial variables respond signi…cantly Figure 6 .
immediately-long term treasury yield falls and the stock price increases following an unanticipated expansion in the size of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. 13 Our results on the e¤ects of the US QE shock on US …nancial variables are consistent with the high-frequency based announcement e¤ects literature. In addition, with our approach, here we can assess the e¤ects on macroeconomic variables and …nd them to be signi…cant. Like the identi…ed VAR literature on conventional monetary policy, we …nd robust and signi…cant e¤ect on output. Somewhat di¤erently from that literature, perhaps strikingly so, we also …nd strong e¤ects on consumer prices. We further assess the e¤ects of a QE shock on …nancial market variables by extending the baseline VAR with inclusion of other variables. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses when we include the 20-year treasury yield in the baseline system. In terms of identi…cation, we extend the restrictions in Table 1 by including the 20-year yield in the interest rate determination ("F") sector. We …nd a robust decline also in the 20-year yield in response to an expansionary US QE shock.
We next consider a further extension of our baseline …ve variable VAR. We do so by adding two important variables: a private sector yield and an additional asset price. For private sector yields, we consider both a corporate yield and a mortgage yield. In terms of identi…cation, we now include the private sector yield (one at a time) in the interest rate determination ("F") sector and the two additional asset prices (one at a time) in the information ("I") sector. Moreover, we impose that the Federal Reserve does not respond to the private sector yield or the additional asset price contemporaneously. The speci…c identifying restrictions in this expanded VAR are presented in Table 2 . Like earlier, Table 2 describes identifying restrictions on A 0 where the columns correspond to the variables while the rows correspond to the sectors: 
Notes: "X" indicates that the corresponding coe¢ cient of A 0 is not restricted and blanks mean that the corresponding coe¢ cient of A 0 is restricted to zero. Figure 8 shows the impulse responses when we extend the baseline VAR by including both a measure of corporate yield and the US nominal e¤ective exchange rate. It is clear that the US QE shock both decreases the corporate yield as well as depreciates the US nominal e¤ective exchange rate. 14 Figure 9 shows the impulse responses when we extend the baseline VAR by including both a measure of mortgage yield and the US nominal e¤ective exchange rate. It shows clearly that the US QE shock both decreases the mortgage yield as well as depreciates the US nominal e¤ective exchange rate. Thus, these extended results are also consistent with the …nancial market e¤ects of QE policies identi…ed in the announcement e¤ect literature. 
Periods after impact

S&P500
We next show our results when we include as private yield the Mortgage yield and as an asset price Housing prices. It is clear from Figure that the US QE shock both decreases the mortgage yield as well as increases the house price index. Again, these extended results are consistent with the …nancial market e¤ects of QE policies identi…ed in the announcement e¤ect literature.
NEED TO ADD REFERENCE TO THE HOUSE PRICE FIGURE HERE
The estimated identi…ed QE shock from the baseline VAR for the US is presented in Figure  10 along with the growth rate in securities held outright and the reduced form QE shock (the shock to securities held outright). Note that we have postulated that the unconventional monetary policy of the Federal Reserve is well approximated by a rule that determines the Federal Reserve's demand for securities as a linear function of the contemporaneous longterm yield and the lags of macroeconomic and …nancial variables. The estimated QE shock presented in Figure 10 then can be understood as the unanticipated deviation of securities held outright from this prescription of policy, which is exogenous to the development of the US economy. The growth rate of securities held outright is a …rst-pass measure of QE by the Federal Reserve. However, it partly re ‡ects the endogenous response of the Federal Reserve's demand for securities to the state of the US economy and thus is not appropriate to estimate the causal e¤ect of unconventional monetary policy. Indeed our identi…ed QE shock series are not perfectly matched with the growth rate of securities held outright though they co-move with it to some extent. They are not exactly aligned with important announcement dates of the QE program as well. We believe that our econometric methodology that is based on a system of equations for macroeconomic and …nancial data and identifying restrictions for structural shocks allows us to separate out the dynamic e¤ects of QE apart from its immediate announcement e¤ects. Finally, there is also a di¤erence between the identi…ed and the reduced form shock, illustrating the role played by our identi…cation assumptions. Finally, we assess the importance of the identi…ed US QE shock in explaining forecast error variance of the various varaibles at di¤erent horizons. As documented by the large literature on conventional monetary policy shock, the US QE shock explains a non-trivial, but not predominant, amount of variable in output and prices. For example, at the 6 and 12 month horizons, the QE shock explains at most 15% of the variation in output and prices and a similar fraction of the variation for long-term interest rates and stock prices. 
Spillover E¤ects of US QE Shock
We now assess the international spillover e¤ects on emerging markets of the US QE shock identi…ed and estimated above. We …rst start with the "Fragile Five"countries.
Fragile Five Countries
Figures 11-13 display the impulse responses of nominal exchange rates, long-term yields and major stock market indices for the "Fragile Five" countries and Figure 14 plots the impulse responses of equity ‡ows for Brazil and Turkey to the estimated US QE shock, along with one standard deviation error bands. Several results stand out. First, a monetary expansion through the QE program in the US leads to a depreciation of US dollar quite uniformly against the currencies of the emerging market economies. Figure 11 shows that currencies of Indonesia and Turkey went through a particularly robust and signi…cant appreciation, while the median response is consistently negative for the rest of the countries. This result con…rms anecdotal evidence on the behavior of exchange rates of these emerging market economies that has received signi…cant attention in the media, in particular after the taper scare period. Second, we …nd that a positive QE shock in the US causes a decline of the long-term yields and a boom in the stock market in the emerging market economies. In Figure 12 , long-term yields negatively respond to a positive US QE shock in the short-run for all the …ve countries. For Turkey, the signi…cant impact of the US QE shock on long-term yields persists for almost two years. This decline in long term rates is consistent with international spillover of announcement e¤ect literature, e.g. Neely (2013) and Glick and Leduc (2012) . Evidence on the stock market indices is not as strong as that on the long-term yields. As Figure 13 shows, the stock market of India strongly and persistently booms after a US QE shock while the e¤ect is marginally signi…cant for the stock markets in Indonesia and Turkey. The stock market in Brazil responds negatively Figure 12 : Impulse responses of long-term yields for selected emerging market economies Notes: For the information on the long-term yields, see the main text. Also, see the notes in Figure 11 . Figure 13 : Impulse responses of major stock market indices for selected emerging market economies Notes: For the information on the stock market indices, see the main text. Also, see the note in Figure 11 . Figure 14 : Impulse responses of cumulative equity ‡ows for selected emerging market economies Notes: For the information on cumulative equity ‡ows, see the main text. Also, see the notes in Figure 11 .
We now study the real implications of the QE shock. This is a major advantage of using a monthly VAR methodology as we can go beyond estimating just the e¤ects on the …nancial variables. Figures 15, 16, and 17 show the impulse responses of industrial production, CPI, and the short-term (3 month) interest rate respectively for these emerging market countries. For output and consumer prices, we do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects. For the short-term interest rate, while the e¤ects are not precisely estimated for all the countries, consistent with our results above for the long-term yields, they decline. 16 Finally, in light of the appreciation of the currencies that we showed above, we assess the implications on net exports for these countries. Figure 18 shows that indeed a signi…cant decline in net exports occurred in India and Indonesia following an expansionary QE shock. For other countries however, the e¤ects are not precisely estimated. Figure 15 : Impulse responses of industrial production for selected emerging market economies
Notes: See the notes in Figure 11 . Figure 16 : Impulse responses of CPI for selected emerging market economies
Notes: See the notes in Figure 11 . Figure 18 : Impulse responses of net exports to the US for selected emerging market economies Notes: Net exports are in terms of US dollars and normalized by monthly GDP of each country. Also, see the notes in Figure 11 .
Other Emerging Markets
We now study the spillovers to eight additional emerging market economies: Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Like with the "Fragile Five" countries, we …rst start with …nancial variables. Figure 19 shows that exchange rate depreciation as a result of an expansionary US QE shock was not limited only to the "Fragile Five" countries as all countries'other than Chile's currency appreciate in a statistically signi…cant manner against the US dollar. With long-term yields, there is also evidence of their reduction, as shown in Figure 20 , but the e¤ect is less strong than for the "Fragile Five"countries.
The most signi…cant response is in the long-term yields of Thailand and South Korea. Similarly, Figure 21 shows some evidence for a stock market boom in this set of emerging market economies as well, but the e¤ects are most often not statistically signi…cant. Finally, as shown in Figure , there is evidence for equity in ‡ows in these countries following a positive US QE shock, but the e¤ects are very imprecisely estimated and only statistically signi…cant for Taiwan. Overall, these results suggest that qualitatively, the …nancial spillovers of the US QE shock are similar across all emerging markets, but the e¤ects are somewhat more pronounced for the "Fragile Five"countries. Figure 20 : Impulse responses of long-term yields for other selected emerging market economies
REFERENCE FIGURE FOR RESULTS ABOUT EQUITY FLOWS
Notes: See the notes in Figure 11 .
We next assess the real implications of these …nancial spillovers. Like before, we now present the impulse responses of output, CPI, and net exports while including the response of the short-term interest rate as well for completeness. 17 Except for a few instances, overall, show no evidence of statistically signi…cant real e¤ects of the US QE shock. In some instances for net exports, it in fact responds positively. Cumulative equity flows
Comparison Across Two Groups
We now compare the results for the two groups of emerging market economies that we considered above. To do so, for each group, across the countries, we compute the median of the e¤ects at each point time. 18 This exercise is useful both to get an overall picture for the two sets of countries as well as to compare them to each other. The results are shown in Figure . As is clear, for both sets of countries, there is evidence for exchange rate appreciation, stock market boom, reduction in long-term interest rates, as well as an increase in capital ‡ows. Moreover, consistent with visual evidence from country-speci…c VARs above, the Fragile Five countries respond more strongly compare to the rest of the emerging market economies in our sample.
NEED TO ADD HERE REFRENCE TO THE MEDIANS AT EACH POINT IN TIME RESULTS
Robustness and Extensions
We have used non-recursive restrictions on the A 0 matrix for identi…cation of the US QE shock. Another widely used identifying restrictions in the empirical conventional monetary policy literature is to use recursive restriction on the A 0 matrix. A natural question is whether the recursive identi…cation scheme would also work well for an unconventional monetary policy case. To investigate this, we use the set of restrictions illustrated below in Table 3 . To make the restrictions as close to our baseline identi…cation strategy, we could use two possible ordering of variables. In both, it is natural to have Industrial production …rst, PCE de ‡ator second, and S&P 500 Index last. We then experiment with having Securitied held outright ordered third or fourth. In the former, it would imply that the Federal Reseve would not respond to the long-term interest rate contemporanesouly, while in the latter, it would. Note that as is well-known, one important di¤erence between the recursive and non-recursive identi…cation schemes is whether current Industrial production and PCE de ‡ator are in the information set of the Federal Reserve or not. In addition, here, it also means that the liquidity prior restrictions that we imposed before on both the monetary policy equation as well as the …nancial markets equation can no longer be applied as A 0 is lower-diagonal. Thus, we can only use one set of liquidity priors. Table 4 : Identifying recursive restrictions on A 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Figures show that the recursive identi…cation scheme has issues with separating shifts in monetary policy from shifts in the …nancial market. Thus, when securities held outright increase exogenously, we see that long-term interest rates increase, which is in contradiction to our baseline results. Based on these results, we thus conclude that the combination of non-recursive restrictions on the A 0 matrix and liquidity priors are essential in our baseline exercise to identify a US QE shock.
ADD THE REFERENCE TO THE TWO FIGURES HERE FOR THE RECURSIVE CASE
We have also undertaken other extensive robustness checks on our baseline VAR estimation on US data. Details of some of these exercises are in the appendix, where we show that our results are largely robust to considering alternative Treasury yields, output measures, 
S&P500
consumer price measures, our house price measures. In particular, while statistical signi…cance is an issue for some cases, an expansionary QE shock robustly decreases Treasury yields and increases output and prices.
Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the spillover e¤ects of US Quantitative Easing (QE) on emerging market economies. Using a VAR with non-recursive identi…cation method on monthly US macroeconomic and …nancial data, we …rst estimate a US QE shock and infer its e¤ects on US variables. We …nd that an unanticipated expansionary US QE shock led to an increase in output and consumer prices in the US. These results are remarkably robust and strong.
In addition, we …nd that the US QE shock also drove down long-term treasury yields while increasing stock prices. In an extension, we also provide evidence in support of reductions in corporate and mortgage yields as well as a deprectiation of the US exchange rate and an increase in housing prices. Thus, the QE shock had a signi…cant e¤ect on both …nancial and macroeconomic variables in the US. We then use this identi…ed US QE shock to infer the spillover e¤ects on emerging market economies with a focus …rst on the "Fragile Five"countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa. We …nd that an expansionary US QE shock leads to an exchange rate appreciation, a reduction in long-term bond yields, and a stock market boom for these emerging market countries. These e¤ects, while smaller, are also present for other emerging market economies. Other than positive e¤ects on equity ‡ows and a reduction in net exports for the "Fragile Five" countries, we do not …nd consistent and signi…cant e¤ects of the US QE shock on other macroeconomic variables such as output and prices of any emerging market countries.
In future work, we plan to conduct counterfactual experiments as well as use a panel VAR methodology to further assess the spillover e¤ects of the US QE shock. Our empirical results should be helpful in establishing a set of stylized facts that can guide open economy models of unconventional monetary policy transmission mechanism. Thus, one can use these results to extend standard open economy models such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) . While doing so, various mechanisms proposed in the closedeconomy literature for why quantitative easing policies have macroeconomic e¤ects can be extended to the open economy. Some examples are e¤ects of quantitative easing through credit intermediation (Gertler and Karadi (2011)), provision of scarce collateral (Williamson (2012)), or signalling of future lower interest rates (Bhattarai, Eggertssson, and Gafarov (2015) ).
Appendix
Here, we show results when we undertake robustness checks by considering alternate Treasury yields and output and price measures in our baseline …ve variable US VAR. 
